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Previous studies have reported a connection between creativity and dishonesty
(Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth,
2014). This study attempts to investigate these finding further, and empirically connect
the number of justifications provided or produced for a dishonest behavior to the
perceived acceptability of the behavior. 203 participants were given two tasks involving
evaluating and justifying dishonest behavior. Those who scored high on the Creative
Behavior Inventory were able to produce significantly more justifications overall, but not
those who scored high on the Creative Personality Scale. The total number of
justifications produced was correlated with the average perceived acceptability of
dishonest behavior. However, when justifications were provided, they were not
significantly correlated with the perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior.
Finally, this study was unable to find any significant connection between creativity and
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior, contrary to previous studies. Implications,
limitations, and future directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE
Statement of the Problem
To many in Western culture, creativity is seen as a positive trait to be fostered and
nurtured. Successful companies strive to find innovative thinkers and creative
personalities to help gain an edge against the competition (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham,
2004). School children are taught that George Washington’s creative use of his small
militia led to the success of the Revolutionary War. In academia, the ability to create and
synthesize new information from old is considered the highest level (and ultimate goal)
of critical thinking skills (Krathwohl, 2002). Despite creativity’s value and positive
qualities, negatives also exist. True to the saying that “there are two sides to every coin,”
creativity does indeed have a dark side.
The dark side of creativity includes evidence that some creative people may be
more likely to be dishonest. In a series of studies, Gino and Ariely (2012), found that
scores on creative personality measures and dishonesty are positively correlated. They
also found that being primed to think creatively increases the likelihood of engaging in
dishonest behavior. When given opportunities to justify dishonest behavior, both creative
and non-creative groups behaved equally dishonestly, but when opportunities to justify
behaviors were low, creative people were more dishonest than non-creative people (Gino
& Ariely, 2012). Beaussart et al. (2013) supported this connection between creativity and
1

dishonesty with a study of their own, reporting that people who scored high on creativity
measures were more likely to cheat by taking extra credit that they had not earned.
The relationship between creativity and dishonesty also seems to be a two-way
street. Not only were people more likely to behave dishonestly when they were primed to
think creatively, (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but people who behaved dishonestly in another
study (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014) were subsequently more creative, even after accounting
for creative differences. If dishonesty and creativity were cousins, their common relative
would appear to be divergence, or rule-breaking, as participants who engaged in
dishonest and creative tasks described feelings of being unconstrained by rules (Gino &
Wiltermuth, 2014).
Gino and Ariely (2012) explain that their findings are evidence that creativity may
increase a person’s ability to generate reasons to justify their behavior, thus promoting
dishonesty. Specifically, they put participants in a position in which they were able to lie
in order to earn more money from the study. They were randomly placed into conditions
that either allowed for or limited opportunities to create justifications for lying. It was
found that the group with more opportunities to justify lying was more likely to lie.
Additionally, some creative people were more likely to lie than non-creative people when
there were fewer opportunities to justify the behavior, but that difference was not found
in the condition allowing for more justifications. Their conclusion from these findings is
that “creativity promotes dishonesty by increasing individuals’ ability to generate reasons
to justify their dishonest behavior” (Gino & Ariely, 2012, pp. 22).
However, the participants were not specifically asked if they made any
justifications at all, nor were the number of justifications made tallied. Additionally, it
2

was not measured if justifications themselves are what promote dishonesty. So, while we
can reasonably infer that more justifications were made and that more justifications
promote dishonesty, this current study was designed to further clarify these findings. It
looks into whether creative people actually do produce more justifications, and if the
number of justifications provided for dishonesty affects a person's view of dishonest
behavior.
Purpose of This Project
This project aims to look more closely at the mechanisms that connect creativity
with dishonest behavior. Gino and Ariely (2012) suggest that creativity may help people
generate various reasons to justify dishonest actions that they see as credible, and that the
more easily justifications can be produced, the more likely someone will behave
dishonestly. These justifications can serve as a mechanism for minimizing the perceived
negative elements of the action, allowing one to morally disengage (Bandura, 1999).
Gino & Ariely’s study found that when given opportunity to create justifications, those
who were primed for creativity were not more likely to behave dishonestly than those
who were not, but that creative personality led to greater likelihood of dishonestly, with
or without opportunities for justifications (Gino & Ariely, 2012). The driving logic
behind previous researchers’ connection between creativity and dishonesty (Gino &
Ariely, 2012) is that no matter how creative a person is, if a large number of credible
justifications are provided for a dishonest behavior, a person is more likely to condone it,
and that creative people are able to produce more justifications, even when they have
fewer opportunities to do so. This possibility has been suggested by researchers, but to
date no research has been done to empirically investigate this specific idea.
3

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Creativity
As described in the introduction, creativity is the focus of this study, and at first
glance, it may seem like a well-understood term. The average person is likely to use the
word creativity in their everyday language. Children are praised for being creative in their
art projects, people are complimented on their creative room decorations, and employers
often describe a way of completing a task at work as creative. Generally speaking, it
would seem that most people share a common meaning of creativity. However, when it
comes to defining creativity for the purposes of scientific research, the definition is a
little harder to pin down. For example, should creativity be measured based on past
achievements, self-perceptions, thought processes, task performance, or something else
entirely? Also, how does one determine if an activity is especially creative? Experts?
How should one determine who a creative expert is? Should it be by number of creative
achievements or notable creative achievements, or something else? Because there are so
many dimensions of creativity and many different ways to operationalize it, research on
“creativity” may, in fact, address very different aspects of creativity, sometimes
producing results based on very different criteria.

4

A working definition of creativity for this project is the rendering of original
ideas, original working and thinking processes, and original products (Barron, 1955;
Simonton, 2003), and the ability to produce novel ideas that are also adaptive. (Amabile,
1988; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Based on research by Gino and Ariely (2012), this project
will be measure creativity using a person’s own view of their creativity (how would they
describe themselves), and how many creative achievements they have completed in their
lifetime. This certainly does not encompass all of the ways creativity can be measured,
and these measurements can be applied in several different ways to define creativity, but
it is a reasonable place to start because this definition includes elements of both
divergence and flexibility that appear repeatedly in scholarly descriptions of and research
regarding creativity (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Barron, 1955;
Beaussart, Andrews, and Kaufman, 2013; Getzels & Jackson, 1962; Gino & Ariely,
2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Guilford, 1975; Silvia, 2008; Simonton, 2003;
Torrance, 1959; Wallach & Kogan, 1965).
One characteristic of creativity that is of interest in this project is an ability and
willingness to bend or break established structures in a way that produces desirable
outcomes. The creative person sees the guidelines presented for a particular task and is
willing to be flexible to achieve oftentimes not only the original goal, but also selfexpression (Getzels & Jackson, 1962). Creative people possess fluid, flexible thinking and
produce original ideas that are appropriate for the situation (Amabile, Conti, Coon,
Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Torrance, 1959). This willingness and flexibility may play a role
in a creative person’s tendency towards dishonesty.

5

The Structure of Intellect Model (Guilford, 1975) offers a bit of background that
may explain some of the creativity/dishonesty connection. In this model, divergent thinking,
the ability to think of unique answers to a question, is thought to be a key precursor to
creativity (Guilford, 1975). That is, the creative thinker has original ideas, new perspectives
on existing ideas, and more ideas in general (Silvia, 2008; Wallach & Kogan, 1965).
Sometimes included in divergent thinking are dishonest solutions to problems.
Creative people remain open to the world, willing and able to see things differently
than others, including those of authority and those whom they care for. Creativity has been
found to have a positive relationship with openness to experience scores on the NEO (Baer
& Oldham, 2006; Feist, 1998; Shalley et al., 2004). Creative people’s ideas are not bound
by the conventional, giving them a tendency to satisfy desires that are traditionally inhibited
(Getzels & Jackson, 1962), and a likelihood to do so through dishonest means (Gino &
Ariely, 2012).
Some scholars believe that creativity is about cognitive flexibility as well as
divergent thinking (Spiro & Jehng, 1990). While divergent thinking involves producing a
higher number of ideas as well as more original and complex ideas (Guilford, 1975; Silvia,
2008; Wallach & Kogan, 1965), cognitive flexibility is the ability to adapt to people,
situations, and environments by restructuring knowledge (Rende, 2000). Flexibility in one’s
thinking can help solve problems (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988), allowing someone to “roll
with the punches” of life, so to speak. In other words, a creative person may have a wider
arsenal of coping strategies (Runco, 2004), and a stronger ability to think beyond the
confines of one’s preconceptions (Ward, Thompson, Lake, Ely, & Kaminski, 2008). The
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extension of this idea is the question of whether a creative person will be just as apt to think
divergently and be flexible with acceptance of dishonesty.
Development of Moral Theory
The goal of this project is to understand more about why some creative people are
more dishonest, and so, it is useful to get an understanding of why people in general may be
dishonest or where our ideas about honesty come from in the first place. Definitions of and
theories related to morality are as diverse as those on creativity. However, a survey of
current theories about morality will reveal certain commonalities that are uncontroversial.
One of these is the idea that emotions play an especially important role in moral
development, moral persuasion, and moral decision making (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001;
Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Pizarro, 2000).
The Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2001) builds on the idea of social
intuitionism. In contrast to Kohlberg’s (1977) emphasis on cognitive processes in moral
reasoning, Moral Foundations Theory argues that at their core, moral judgments, actions,
and beliefs involve a primarily emotional process, with an interaction between emotions and
rationalizations. When one comes across a situation in which a moral judgment can be
made, an initial emotional reaction takes place based on instinctual values developed
through a combination of biological and cultural evolutionary processes. Following the
initial emotional reaction, a person will often rationalize his or her judgment, typically via
unconscious processes (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993). Haidt theorizes that
rationalizations are produced after moral judgments in order to support the preceding
emotions, rather than before, and that moral judgments are not dependent on whether or not
rationalizations successfully explain their emotions (Haidt, 2012; Margolis, 1987).
7

However, a more “chicken or the egg” relationship may exist, where emotions serve as
motivations to produce justifications, and justifications alter moral emotions. The
connection can be seen if a person with creative tendencies is to be able to produce
justifications that allow them to manipulate their own emotions to more readily justify
dishonesty. Creative people may be using superior divergent thinking skills and cognitive
flexibility to persuade themselves to feel less morally convicted about dishonest behaviors.
Mind Perception
The interaction between cognitions and emotions is just one element involved in
moral decisions. The interaction between people and even how we perceive people is
worth investigating in connection to morality. It is not immoral for a person to get great
joy out of kicking a soccer ball, but finding great joy in kicking a baby certainly is. Gray,
Young, & Waytz (2012) argue that the difference between the two actions, and the
essence of morality itself, comes down to “mind” perception. The use of the word “mind”
refers to an understanding of and empathy towards the emotions, perceptions, and
feelings of another. While we may have a sense of our own mind, we cannot objectively
measure the existence of another’s mind. Sure, a friend can tell us that he is hurting or
what he is thinking, and it is this that allows us to infer that he has a mind, but even brain
scans and self-report measures offer only an indirect access into the mind, making it
ultimately a matter of perception. It is when we perceive the minds of others that we can
then work to understand what that mind is thinking, feeling, or desiring. If we view others
as having a mind, then we can develop empathy for others, see them and ourselves as
moral agents, and attribute moral rights and responsibilities to them (Bastian, Laham,
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Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray et al., 2012). In other words, when we perceive the
mind of another, we are more likely to treat others as we would want to be treated.
Oftentimes, mind perception is not about whether or not a mind exists (e.g., rock
vs. baby), but it is about deciding which agents deserve how much of our concern or
moral intention—who or what we include in our “moral circle” (Pizarro, DetweilerBedell, & Bloom, 2006). Attributing (or not attributing) agency, that is, a “mind”, to
someone has been shown to affect the perception of one’s morality. If a person is able to
deny to oneself that another has agency and is able to dehumanize the other in some way,
they can effectively exclude that person from their moral circle, and then even harmful
acts against him or her can be justified (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli,
1996; Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee,
& Galinsky, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2011).
The idea that morality is not just a cognitive exercise in reasoning as once thought
(Kohlberg, 1977) but a flexible process involving interactions between both cognitions
and feelings (Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, 2000) opens up the concept that deciding who/what to
value morally, how to behave, and how we justify what we do involves more than just
logic and can be influenced by our emotions, social environments, cultural histories, and
personality traits - including creativity.
Moral Disengagement
To understand how a creative person may possess greater ability to manipulate his
or her moral circle, it is important to understand how it is done in general. Bandura’s
Social Cognitive Theory (1991) explains that the moral standards of an individual and/or
society are formed not by using logic and reasoning to analyze potential benefits and
9

drawbacks alone. The theory proposes that it also includes the processes of observing
how behaviors inflict suffering on others, what levels of suffering are present for actions
(which can vary from action to action and individual to individual), how circumstances
and intentions affect the perceived acceptability of certain actions, and how others are
perceived. This affects how much it matters to someone if their actions bring harm.
People may be capable of moral reasoning, but until they give agency to those around
them, they are not going to act morally (Bandura, 1991).
A person faces a moral dilemma when he or she wishes to behave in a selfserving manner, but in doing so would be potentially harmful, as is the case with being
dishonest. Engaging in potentially harmful behavior could affect not only others’ view of
the person, but also his or her self-image. A person is likely to make a compromise of
sorts; to behave “a bit” dishonestly to satisfy the self-serving desire, but not so much so
as to affect ones positive self-image and moral reputation (Mead, Baumeister, Gino,
Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). By behaving “just a little” dishonestly, a person provides
oneself the opportunity to produce justifications for the dishonest behavior (Ayal & Gino,
2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009). For example, in one study, people selling a car were
given the option to provide an estimation of mileage to the buyer based on a range. They
found that the wider the range, the more likely the seller was to lie about the mileage,
justifying the lie through the larger amount of uncertainty (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). It
would seem that the better skilled a person is at producing what they believe are
reasonable justifications for dishonesty, the more likely they are to subscribe to them
(Kunda, 1990). If someone is able to morally disengage, or in other words, separate one’s
emotions and ideas about right and wrong from one’s own conduct, the likelihood of
10

aggressive and harmful behaviors is heightened (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson,
1975; Diener, 1977; Diener, Dineen, Endresen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975; Haney, Banks,
& Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1974; Tilker, 1970). Essentially, when people morally
disengage, they convince themselves that the rules do not apply specifically to them in
their specific situation. This is where the connection to creativity can be made in that a
creative person may be more skilled at producing more, and more convincing,
justifications.
According to Bandura (1996), there are many ways that a person can justify
engagement in behavior they would normally see as wrong, such as dishonesty. Tilker
(1970) found that when a person is made fully responsible for the safety of another, and
they are receiving both visual and auditory feedback from that person, they are more
likely to behave in a socially responsible manner towards him or her (Tilker, 1970). This
supports the idea that moral behavior hinges on both seeing oneself and others as a
human being with thoughts, feelings, and value.
Another method of moral disengagement is to choose to view a harmful or
immoral behavior as something that furthers a good, moral cause, or as required for selfdefense (Bandura, 1996; Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kramer, 1990;
Smelser, 1971). Also, language is a powerful tool in justifying behavior. Rewording
things to seem “better” can be powerfully disinhibiting (Bandura, 1996; Diener et al.,
1975) and can make behaviors seem less reprehensible or even respectable (Bolinger,
1980; Lutz, 1987). Examples of this in everyday life include telling a “white lie” rather
than deceiving, “venting” rather than gossiping, or “borrowing” rather than stealing.
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Another way that a person may justify harmful or immoral behaviors is through
displacing or diffusing responsibility (Bandura, 1996, 1999). For example, a person may
believe that because they only participated in one small part of something immoral, what
they had done was done was not actually wrong. This moral disengagement was seen
among many involved in The Holocaust, explaining that they, for example, only
transported prisoners, kept records, or so on (Andrus, 1969). Similarly, if a dishonest
behavior becomes routinized and divided across several people or departments, it
becomes easier for a person to justify it, allowing them to see even acts of murder as “all
in a day’s work” (Kelman, 1973).
In the study by Diener et al. (1975), people were found to be almost 38 times as
aggressive when they believed they were not going to be held accountable for their
behavior, observed a model enacting aggressive behavior, or were put into a mindset to
see their aggressive behaviors as a game (Diener, et al., 1975; Milgram, 1974).
Another way that someone may create justification for immoral behaviors is
through dehumanization. The act of dehumanization changes patterns of thought and
changes the view of the person to one with diminished or no feelings, hopes, needs or
concerns (Duster, 1971; Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1973). When dehumanization occurs, it
becomes more likely that a person will create moral justifications for aggressive or
harmful actions against the dehumanized individual (Bandura et al., 1975; Duster, 1971;
Milgram, 1974). History has shown that moral disengagement has contributed to crimes
against humanity (Andrus, 1969; Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989;
Rapoport & Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990). When given an opportunity to justify selfserving or dishonest behaviors, a person is more likely to engage in the dishonesty than
12

when not given the opportunity for justifications (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002; Shalvi,
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). If a creative
person is able to produce opportunities for justification and moral disengagement, this
may explain the positive relationship between creativity and dishonesty.
Creativity and Morality
Haidt and colleagues have made the case that morality and moral judgments are in
many ways socially driven (Haidt, 2001, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993) and are affected by our
perceptions of others as well as our emotions towards them (Haidt, 2012; Miller, 1997;
Pizarro et al., 2006; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). We have also learned that creative
people are capable of taking what they are given and producing new ideas, conclusions, and
products, often with the effect of persuading others to view ideas and situations differently
(Pizarro et al., 2006; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Silvia 2008; Simonton, 2003; Torrance, 1959;).
Thus, it seems plausible that creative people are more likely to be able to manipulate the
cognitive and emotional interaction, shaping and re-directing empathy and related emotions
when making moral decisions so as to justify what would otherwise seem immoral, such as
dishonesty.
Pizarro et al. (2006) propose that throughout history, it was those who resonate with
and sway others’ emotions—the poets, public speakers, politicians, musicians, and artists—
that challenged and changed the moral beliefs of individuals and societies. Through creative
uses of language, images, stories, songs, and movies, the shifting of the ideas on right and
wrong is influenced by emotions. Gino and Ariely (2012) found that when someone is
primed to think creatively, they are more likely to behave dishonestly. They suggest that this
is because creative people are able to generate more justifications, making the dishonesty
13

more likely to occur. For the creative person, an ethical dilemma poses a difficult situation
for which they may have a unique set of skills that allow them to produce creative solutions.
When problems are difficult, a creative person’s cognitive flexibility combines with
divergent thinking to create a fertile environment for a justification process favoring selfserving conclusions, and ultimately, moral disengagement (Gino & Ariely, 2012).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The primary purpose of this study is to clarify the nature of the relationship
between dishonesty and creativity. It is possible that creative people will generate more
justifications for dishonest behavior than less creative people. If this is true, it is perhaps
the mere exposure to more justifications for dishonesty that results in more dishonest
behavior. For this study, justifications are defined as statements or ideas that lesson the
perceived harm an action causes, or perceived moral wrong committed (Haidt 2001,
Hauser, 2006; Hauser et al., 2007).
This line of reasoning rests on two assumptions. First, that creative people are
able to generate more justifications for dishonest behavior, and second, that generating
more justifications for dishonesty tends to make people more tolerant of their own
dishonest behavior. Based on these ideas, four hypotheses were developed:
Hypothesis 1: Scores on creativity measurements will be correlated with numbers
of justifications produced for dishonest behavior (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: The number of justifications for a dishonest behavior will be
correlated with the perceived acceptability of the behavior, supporting the idea that it will
be more likely for someone to engage in the behavior (Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Figure 2. Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 3: The number of justifications for a dishonest behavior will act as a
mediator between creativity and the perception of acceptability of the behavior (Figure
1).
Hypothesis 4: Social desirability scores on the Balanced Inventory of Desirable
Responding (BIDR) measure will moderate the relationship between creativity and the
number of justifications. Although not a focus of this study, it is expected that the BIDR
will have a negative correlation with the perceived acceptability of dishonesty (Figure 1).
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
Participants
A total of 205 people participated in this study. Data from two participants were
excluded; one participant did not speak English fluently, and the other appeared to be
under the influence of mind-altering substances. This left a final sample of 203
participants between the ages of 18-46 (M = 19.6, SD = 2.6). The participants were asked
to indicate their age, sex, ethnicity, GPA, and estimated parental income. Table 1
summarizes these demographic variables. All participants gave written informed consent.
The procedure was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Illinois State
University. Participants were selected from the Illinois State University Psychology
Research Participant Pool.
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Table 1
Demographic Data Frequencies and Percentages
Variable
Frequency
Age
18
69
19
54
20
45
21
18
22–29
15
30–34
1
45–49
1
Gender
Male
38
Female
165
Race/Ethnicity
African-American
12
Native American
1
East Asian
1
South Asian
2
White (not Hispanic)
170
Other
1
GPA
1.5-1.99
3
2.0-2.49
4
2.5-2.99
27
3.0-3.49
61
3.5-3.74
50
3.75-3.99
35
4.0
20
Missing
3
Parent Income
Less than $5000
1
$5000-$20000
11
$20000-$60000
46
$60000-$100000
70
$100000-$150000
46
>$150000
26
Missing
3
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Percent
34.0
26.6
22.2
8.9
7.3
.5
.5
18.7
81.3
5.9
.5
.5
1.0
83.7
.5
1.5
2.0
13.3
30.0
24.6
17.2
9.9
1.5
.5
5.4
22.7
34.5
22.7
12.8
1.5

Measures
Measures were chosen to parallel the instruments used by Gino and Ariely (2012)
in their research on the relationship between creativity and dishonesty. Two creativity
assessments were chosen.
Creativity Personality Scale
Gough’s Creative Personality Scale (Gough, 1979) is a self-report measure of
creativity as a part of the Adjective Check List. It is a 30-item self-report survey of
various personality characteristics. The survey was originally developed to be used by
observers in describing others, but evolved into a self-report measure. The checklist asks
participants to select adjectives from a list that describes their personality, but can also be
used to identify a person’s ideal self, beliefs, values, ideal mate or almost anything else
the adjectives could describe.
The current version of the checklist has 37 different subscales, one of which is
Creative Personality. The Creative Personality Scale of the Adjective Checklist asks
participants to read a list of 30 adjectives and select the ones that best describe them.
Some of the adjectives on the list relate to creativity (e.g., insightful, original,
unconventional), and the participants receive a point for every one of the creativity-tied
adjectives that they select.
To develop the Creativity Personality Scale itself, the Adjective Checklist was
administered to 1,701 individuals from a wide range of ages and careers, all with direct or
inferred ratings of creativity available for the individuals. An item analysis was
completed of the six different scales of the checklist that had been previously established
as measures of creativity (Schaefer, 1972, 1973; Smith & Schaefer; 1969; Welsh, 1977),
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and found that 30 items were positively and significantly (p < .01) correlated with those
six scales. These 30 items became the Creativity Personality Scale. For this scale, α
coefficients ranged between .73 and .81.
Even while using samples from a wide range of careers, ages, and testing
circumstances and employing four different perspectives on creativity (expert judges,
faculty members, personality-assessment staff observers, and life-history interviewers),
10 out of 12 of the validity coefficients were significant (p ≤ .05). The criteria chosen
were the Domino creativity measurement, the Schaefer creativity measurement, Welsh
origence/intellectence (high/low combinations of both origence and intellectence), rating
by expert judges, ratings by faculty members, ratings by assessment staff, and rating by
interviewers.
Creative Behavior Inventory
Another creativity measure used in Gino and Ariely’s (2012) research was
Hocevar’s Creative Behavior Inventory (Hocevar, 1980). Participants were presented
with a list of accomplishments and activities that are associated with creativity (e.g.,
wrote an original computer program not for school or university work, painted an original
picture not as a part of school or university work). The participants then indicated
whether they had done each of the activities or accomplishments in their adolescent and
adult life never, once or twice, 3–5 times, or more than 5 times. To score, a sum of the
participant’s ratings is calculated.
The Creative Behavior Inventory was developed initially by asking college
students to list their most creative achievements. Experts rated the list that was produced,
and the items that received the lowest ratings were removed. 90 items were developed.
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The inventory was used in other studies, finding that several Creative Behavior Inventory
subscales correlate with ideational fluency. The internal consistency of the Creative
Behavior Inventory overall is .91 (Dollinger, Urban, & James, 2004). The measurement
items were also originally grouped into six categories (literary accomplishments,
performance arts, crafts, music, and math/science). With the exception of math and
science, all of the categories halve Cronbach α coefficients ranging between .75 and .87.
The math and science category has a Cronbach α coefficient of .53 (Dollinger et al.,
2004). In the current study, the Cronbach α for the total scale of the Creative Behavior
Inventory was .89.
If the two measures of creativity are measures of the same aspect of creativity,
they should have robust correlations with each other. In the study by Gino and Ariely
(2012), the correlation between the Creative Behavior Inventory and the Creative
Personality Scale varied from experiment to experiment from .33 to .45. In the current
study, the correlation between scores from the Creative Behavior Inventory and the
Creative Personality Scale was r(203) = .11, p = .12, possibly indicating that the two
scales may be measuring different aspects of creativity in this sample. For this reason,
they were not combined into a creativity composite score. Instead, these two measures
were considered separately in all evaluations of hypotheses involving creativity.
Controlled Oral Word Association Test
The current study asked the participants to list as many justifications they were
able to think of. A measure of verbal fluency was administered to ensure that the
participants who produced more justifications were not simply more apt at creating lists.
Consequently, there may have arisen a need to control for speed of thought.
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The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (Benton, Hamsher, &
Rey, 1994) is a brief measure of verbal fluency. For this assessment, the participants were
asked to list as many words as they could that start with the letters F, A, and then S.
Proper nouns, numbers and multiple versions of the same word (i.e. fasted and fasting) do
not count. Additionally, the participants were asked to list as many animals and girls’
names (or boys’ names if male participants) they could think of, as well as creating
alternating lists of furniture and fruit, and clothing and sports. Higher numbers indicate
higher levels of verbal fluency.
The COWAT was originally developed as verbal fluency test for people suffering
from brain injuries. It was oral rather than written (as previous measures had been) to
accommodate for those with damage that prevented them from using their writing hand
or who suffered from arthritis. It was also designed to be short to improve on previous
tests that were seen as tiring and tedious for people who were already in poor physical
condition. The COWAT has a coefficient α of .83 and a 6-month test-retest reliability of
.74 (Ruff, Light, & Parker, 1996). In the current study, the coefficient α was .80. In this
study, the COWAT did not correlate with any of the elements we measure for this study,
and so its use was not necessary for the main analyses.
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
Because this study is focusing on dishonest behaviors, there was a risk that
participants may have felt influenced to respond in certain ways based on perceived
social pressure. Therefore, the participants were given the Balanced Inventory of
Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991). The BIDR is the research version of the
commercial product known as the Paulhus Deception Scale. It measures two forms of
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desirable responding, Impression Management (IM) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement
(SDE). Impression Management is intended to measure a person’s tendency to deceive
others by deliberately inflating self-descriptions. Self-Deceptive Enhancement is intended
to measure inflated self-descriptions that result from unconscious favorable biases rather
than conscious deception. For the assessment itself, respondents read 40 statements, and
indicate how true that statement was on a 7-point scale ranging from not true to true. For
most participants, it takes about 3 to 5 minutes to complete.
The BIDR was developed based on the theory that self-deception consists of two
dimensions: the unconscious effort to deny thoughts and feelings that produce
psychological conflicts, and a conscious effort to portray oneself in the best light
possible. While it is difficult to measure and unconscious bias objectively, the Impression
Management scale is highly correlated with lie scales, such as Eysenck’s Lie scale, and
the MMPI Lie scale, measures of role-playing, such as Wiggins’ SD, and Gough’s Gi,
and the scale is also correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness scores (Paulhus,
1991). These connections to measures of a person’s motivations for social approval, have
contributed to its wide use and acceptability as a scale (Li, & Bagger, 2006). The items
were originally developed to reflect these two ideas rationally, and each subsequent
version of the measure involved adjustments to the items that reflected the latest
empirical studies, conceptual rationales, and practitioner consults.
This measurement of an unconscious bias is difficult, but the BIDR works to
come as close as possible. It doesn’t ask directly, for example, do you inflate your
descriptions of yourself, but rather, it asks participants to answer several questions that
most people would not answer yes to, for example, I never cover up my mistakes. A
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person who answers yes to a great deal of these items may have an unconscious positive
bias
Internal consistency data for 884 male and female college students were reported
with an overall internal consistency α at .83. The α coefficients for Self-Deception ranged
from .68 to .80 and from .75 to .86 for Impression Management. (Paulhus, 1988) Testretest correlations for Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management were
.69 and .65 respectively, with a 5-week waiting period between tests (Paulhus, 1988).
Concurrent validity was assessed by correlating the test with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale
(r = .71; Paulhus, 1988) and the Social Desirability Inventory (r = .80; Jacobson,
Kellogg, Cauce, & Slavin, 1977). For this study, the α coefficients for Self-Deception
was .66, and was .79 for Impression management. The weak coefficient for SelfDeception is discussed in the limitations secion.
International Personality Item Pool
The International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999) is a 50-item
personality measure of the Big-Five factor markers of Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect/Imagination (Goldberg, 1992). For
this measure, participants were asked to read statements and indicate how accurate the
statement is on a 5-point scale ranging from very inaccurate to very accurate. Examples
of items included are “Am the life of the party,” “Have a vivid imagination,” and “Have
excellent ideas.”
The IPIP was created in response to the thousands of personality measures
developed over 75 years of study. The developers saw that the measures assessing broad
personality traits were often copyrighted and rarely tested or improved. They decided to
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produce a public domain personality measure to allow scientists to freely use, assess, and
report findings to each other with the goal of improving personality measurement and
furthering research in the area. The goal was to create a measure with scales mirroring
those in other established measures. They developed 45 initial scales targeting the AB5C
scales. The AB5C is a model of the personality domain based on the big five factors of
personality (Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). Of these, 43 had α coefficients of .70
or higher and 18 with reliabilities at or above .80. Additionally, the IPIP contains 30
constructs similar to the 30 facet scales in the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 2008) with
average Cronbach α scores at .80, higher than the NEO scales (.75). The IPIP also has
scales designed to mirror the Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire, Cloninger's
Temperament and Character Inventory, and Gough’s California Pathological Inventory,
all finding inter item correlations, Cronbach’s α scores, and average α scores at or above
the original measures themselves (Goldberg, 1999). The internal consistency data from
the current study can be seen in Table 2. For this study, the IPIP was used mainly as a
distraction task between study activities.
Procedure
The participants completed a moral justification generation task and a moral
justification evaluation task. The tasks were completed in random order. In between
tasks, the participants completed the IPIP as a distraction task. This was done to reduce
any carryover effects that may have altered the participants’ performance on either task
based on which one was completed first.
Moral Justification Generation Task: When the participants arrived, they were
brought into a room and informed consent was obtained. Next, the participants were
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seated at a computer and read the following short vignette of a person who behaved
dishonestly:
A person was walking down a busy street and saw a stranger drop a large wad
of cash without noticing. Rather than speaking up, the person quickly grabbed
the money off the sidewalk and kept it.
The vignettes used in this study were created because previous studies do not contain
vignettes used for the purpose of collecting justifications, as opposed to determining what
the participant would do. It is important that the vignettes for this study are gender
neutral, involve an act of dishonesty, and are short enough to allow the participant to
project his or her own ideas and justifications onto it.
After they read the vignette, the participants clicked “next” and saw the following
instructions,
In the space provided below, type out a reason that you think would justify what
the person did. There is no need to use full sentences; if it helps you work, you
can just write enough so some else can understand. Feel free to write as few or
as many justifications as you want. When you’ve finished, click the button on the
bottom of the screen that says “done.”
Upon clicking “done,” the participants saw a screen instructing them to rate the
acceptability of the dishonest behavior using a 5-point scale ranging from extremely
unacceptable to extremely acceptable. When the participants finished writing their
justifications, they clicked next, and the following vignette immediately appeared on the
screen,
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A student lived in a dormitory with one roommate and kept alcohol in the room
against university policy. When the RA came by to inspect the room, the person
put the alcohol in the roommate’s drawer and let the roommate take the
punishment.
The participants were then given the same instructions as in the previous task, and they
typed their justifications and evaluation of the acceptability of the dishonest behavior.
When the data was collected, it was observed that many participants did in fact
type out justifications for the behaviors (e.g., “The person was in desperate need of
money,” or “The roommate agreed to take the punishment.”). Other responses were not
justifications, but rather, explanations (e.g., “No morals”) or other types of responses
(e.g., “There is no justification for this behavior,” or “I would go up to the person and ask
him or her to return the money to the stranger.”). Because the hypotheses were concerned
specifically with justifications rather than responses per se, 205 of 925 responses (22%)
were not included in the analyses because they were not justifications. Responses were
eliminated only if they clearly represented a non-justification, as in the examples above.
The items chosen for elimination were reviewed with the study’s committee chair. Even
if all responses are included in the analyses, the conclusions of this study are not altered
substantively.
Moral Justification Evaluation Task: For the second task, the participants’
computer screen displayed this short vignette depicting dishonest behavior,
A person was given an exam for a college course. While taking the test, the
person noticed that the class assistant dropped the test key on the floor without
noticing. The person picked up the key and used it to get 100% on the test.
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When the participants clicked to the next screen, they were randomly presented with
zero, two, four, or eight justifications for the dishonest behavior. The program was loaded
with 15 justifications and the ones that appeared on the participants’ screens were
selected at random. Participants were instructed to assume that the person believes the
statements are true. The complete list of justifications was developed to reflect different
moral disengagement practices commonly used (Bandura, 1996), and is as follows (the
type of moral disengagement is listed in parentheses):


My grandmother died this last week, and so I did not have time to study
(displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame).



If I did not get an A on this test, I would fail the class and be kicked out of school
(displacement of responsibility).



Last test, I tried to get help from the assistant several times, but the assistant was
rude and unhelpful (displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame).



I have never cheated in school before, and I will never do it again (displacement
of responsibility).



The questions were about obscure facts from the book that are only meant to trick
us (displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame).



I’ve seen a lot of people cheating in this class before—it’s not a big deal
(distorting consequences/advantageous comparison).



I only cheated on a few items...I got most of them right on my own (distorting the
consequences/euphemistic language).
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The professor is a graduate student from another country—half the time I can’t
understand what the professor is saying (displacement of responsibility/attribution
of blame/dehumanization).



I don’t even need this class for my major—I’ll never use the information
(distorting consequences).



I have to work a job to pay for my tuition, and it’s just been a busy couple of
weeks with everything going on (displacement of responsibility/attribution of
blame).



I only cheated on this one test—other people plagiarized their entire final paper
(advantageous comparison).



I was just taking advantage of an opportunity that came my way (euphemistic
language).



It was the assistant’s responsibility to keep the key secure, not mine (displacement
of responsibility).



The professor doesn’t grade on a curve so it didn’t lower anyone else’s grade
(disregarding consequences).



With all the assaults and rapes happening around campus, checking a few answers
on a test is not that big of a deal (advantageous comparison).

For each of the justifications, the participants indicated how valid the justification is on a
5-point scale ranging from not at all valid to extremely valid. Next, the participants were
asked, “How acceptable was this person’s behavior?” and they indicated their opinion on
a five point scale ranging from extremely unacceptable to extremely acceptable.
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Assessment Tasks
The participants completed the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999) to measure personality, the
Creativity Personality Scale, and the Creative Behavior Inventory. The participants also
completed the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1998) to assess for
social desirability, and the COWAT (Benton, Hamsher, & Rey, 1994) to measure verbal
fluency. The CPS and CBI were given after both tasks were completed to prevent any
creativity priming that could have taken place if the participants were assessed for
creativity beforehand.
Demographics
For this study demographic data was collected regarding the participants’ age,
gender, race, GPA, and SES (see Table 2).
Debriefing
The participants were debriefed on the research in more detail. They were told
that the purpose of the research was to examine connections between creativity and the
number/types of justifications given for dishonest behavior. The participants were given
the opportunity to ask any questions they may have before they leave.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach α coefficients for all
measures used, as well as the participants’ reported acceptability ratings for both tasks.
For task one, an average of the two vignettes was produced.
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach α Coefficients for All Measures Used and
Acceptability Ratings
Measure
M
SD
α
Creative Personality Scale
16.21
2.15
.63
Creative Behavior Inventory
39.10
20.71
.89
COWAT (z-score)
0.00
1.00
.80
BIDR Self-Deception
4.06
.64
.66
BIDR Impression Management
3.74
.78
.79
IPIP NEO Extraversion
2.21
.82
.89
IPIP NEO Agreeableness
3.18
.47
.75
IPIP NEO Neuroticism
2.73
.64
.85
IPIP NEO Conscientiousness
2.14
.74
.84
IPIP NEO Openness
2.60
.52
.75
Self-Generated Justifications
3.48
2.45
Task 1 Acceptability of Dishonesty
.65
.56
Task 2 Acceptability of Dishonesty
.75
.84

Hypothesis One
The correlation of the Creative Behavior Inventory and the number of selfgenerated justifications was significant, r(203) = .16, p = .02. The correlation of the
Creative Personality Scale and the total number of self-generated justifications was not
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significant, r(203) = −.07, p = .34. Even where this hypothesis was partially supported,
the effect size was small.
Hypothesis Two
In the first task, the correlation of the total number of self-generated justifications
and the average perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior was significant, r(203) =
.14, p = .03. Although this correlation is consistent with the hypothesis, it should be noted
that it is quite small.
In the second task, the correlation of the total number of manipulated
justifications given and the average perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior was
not significant, r(203) = .09, p = .20. However, as seen in Figure 3, it appears that the
relationship between perceived acceptability and the number of evaluated justifications is
non-linear.
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Figure 3. Mean Task 2 Perceived Acceptability Ratings as a Function of the Number of
Justifications for Dishonesty.

To test the non-linear effect of justifications in an exploratory follow-up analysis,
the predictor was treated as an ordinal variable and the polynomial contrast was
evaluated. Because the outcome variable was a single-item Likert scale with five
categories, ordered logistic regression was conducted instead of ordinary least squares
regression. The polr function from the MASS package (Venables & Ripley, 2002) was
used to compute an ordered logistic regression analysis in the R statistical computing
environment (Version 3.2; R Core Team, 2015). In Table 3, the cubic effect of
justifications is significant.
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Table 3
Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Polynomial Effects of Justification
Exposure and Evaluation on the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in Task 2
[95% CI]
Predictor
𝑏
𝜎𝑏
𝑡
Justifications (Linear)
Justifications (Quadratic)
Justifications (Cubic)
* p < .05

0.43

[−0.14, 1.00]

0.29

1.49

−0.44

[−0.99, 0.11]

0.28

−1.55

[0.06, 1.14]

0.27

2.16

0.59*

In Figure 4, it can be seen that judging the behavior to be extremely unacceptable
is most probable when no justifications have been evaluated and that exposure to at least
some justifications is associated with less intolerant evaluations.

34

Figure 4. Model-Implied Response Probabilities When Number of Justifications Predicts
the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in an Ordered Logistic Regression
Model.

To check the robustness of this finding, additional follow-up analyses were
conducted in which the number of justifications was treated as a nominal variable.
Compared to people who were not exposed to any justifications, people were
significantly less likely to evaluate the dishonest behavior as extremely unacceptable
when exposed to only two justifications (b = 1.16, 95% CI = [0.47, 1.86]) or eight
justifications (b = 0.84, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.66]). Exposure to four justifications was also
associated with a lower probability of harsh evaluation of the behavior (b = 0.55, 95% CI
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= [−0.15, 1.27]), but this difference was not statistically significant. If the number of
justifications variable is collapsed into two categories (No Justifications vs. Two or More
Justifications), the effect still holds (b = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.31, 1.43]).
Overall, this hypothesis was only partially and weakly supported. Although
exposure to at least some justifications appears to lower the severity of participants’
judgments somewhat, as in fewer “extremely unacceptable” responses and more
“unacceptable” responses. At four justifications, the two harshest responses met each
other, still being the two most likely responses. Therefore, there is no evidence that the
effect is cumulative, with additional justifications associated with more tolerance of
dishonest behavior.
Hypothesis Three
As seen in Table 4, neither creativity measure was significantly correlated with
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior in either task. Because there is no observed
relationship between creativity and perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior, there is
no mediator to identify.
Table 4
Correlations of Creativity and Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior
Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior
Measure
Task 1
Task 2
Creative Behavior Inventory
−.08
−.05
Creative Personality Scale
−.002
−.07
Note. None of the correlations are statistically significant.
Despite the null results, the planned mediation analyses were conducted to evaluate the
model from Figure 1 as a whole. The results of a path analysis generated from the R
package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) are presented in Figure 5. In Figure 5, Statistically
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significant standardized paths and correlations are bolded. Although the paths that make
up the hypothesized indirect effect from the Creative Behavior Inventory to perceived
acceptability of dishonesty via the number of self-generated justifications are both
individually statistically significant, the product of the paths (i.e., the indirect effect) is
not significant (b = .02, σb = 0.01, z = 1.47, p = .14). Furthermore, as is already known
from the raw correlation, the total effect of the Creative Behavior Inventory on perceived
acceptability of dishonest ratings is not statistically significant (b = .001, σb = 0.07, z =
0.02, p = .98). Thus, this hypothesis was not supported.

Creative
Personality
Scale
Number of
Self-Generated
Justifications

.11

Creative
Behavior
Inventory

.49

.00

.14

-.04

SelfDeception

.01

Acceptability
of Dishonesty

.20

Impression
Management
Figure 5. Path Analysis of the Task 1 Variables.
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To evaluate Hypothesis 3 for Task 2 (see Figure 2), an ordered logistic regression
was conducted similar to the analyses conducted for Hypothesis 2, with the addition of
the two creativity measures and both social desirability measures as covariates. As seen
in Table 5, neither creativity measure was a significant predictor of perceived
acceptability. However, impression management was associated with less tolerant
evaluations of dishonest behavior, as was exposure to at least some justifications (See
Figure 6).
Table 5
Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients in Task 2
Predictor
𝑏

[95% CI]

𝜎𝑏

𝑡

0.34

[−0.24, 0.93]

0.30

1.16

−0.58*

[−1.16, −0.02]

0.29

−2.01

Justifications (Cubic)

0.64*

[0.09, 1.20]

0.28

2.25

Self-Deception

0.32

[−0.01, 0.66]

0.17

1.91

−0.74*

[−1.05, −0.43]

0.16

−4.69

0.04

[−0.24, 0.31]

0.14

0.29

−0.19

[−0.52, 0.13]

0.17

−1.18

Justifications (Linear)
Justifications (Quadratic)

Impression Management
Creative Behavior Inventory
Creative Personality Scale
* p < .05
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Figure 6. Model-Implied Response Probabilities When Number of Justifications and
Impression Management Predicts the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in
an Ordered Logistic Regression Model.

Hypothesis Four
An evaluation of the hypothesized model implied by Figure 1 was conducted in a
path analysis. As seen in Table 6, none of the interaction effects were statistically
significant. Furthermore the interaction effect model did not significantly improve the
model fit over the analogous main effects model in Figure 5, χ2(4) = 5.98, p = .20.
Despite findings that show the connection between Impression Management and the
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perceived acceptability of dishonesty, no moderating relationships were found, leaving
this hypothesis as a whole unsupported.
Table 6
Path Analysis of Task 1 Variables with Standardized Variables and Interaction Terms
Outcome ~ Predictor
b
z
p
95% CI
𝜎𝑏
Justifications ~
Creative Personality Scale

0.03

0.08

0.36

.72

[−0.13, 0.19]

Creative Behavior Inventory

0.15

0.07

2.23

.03

[0.02, 0.29]

−0.22

0.08

−2.70

.01

[−0.38, −0.06]

Impression Management

0.01

0.07

0.14

.89

[−0.13, 0.15]

CPI × SD

0.00

0.06

−0.06

.96

[−0.13, 0.12]

CPI × IM

0.02

0.07

0.32

.75

[−0.11, 0.15]

CBI × SD

0.04

0.08

0.46

.65

[−0.12, 0.20]

CBI × IM

0.06

0.07

0.88

.38

[−0.08, 0.21]

0.14

0.07

1.96

.05

[0.00, 0.27]

Creative Personality Scale

−0.04

0.08

−0.54

.59

[−0.19, 0.11]

Creative Behavior Inventory

−0.02

0.07

−0.28

.78

[−0.15, 0.12]

Self-Deception

−0.05

0.08

−0.58

.56

[−0.20, 0.11]

Self-Deception

Acceptability ~
Justifications

Impression Management
−0.25
0.07 −3.64 .00 [−0.39, −0.12]
Note. CPI = Creative Personality Scale, CBI = Creative Behavior Inventory, SD = SelfDeception, IM = Impression Management
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Conclusions
Hypothesis One
The first task asked the participants to produce their own justifications for
dishonest behavior, and it was found that those who scored high in the Creative Behavior
Inventory were able to produce more justifications overall, supporting the conclusions of
previous research (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but not those who scored high on the Creative
Personality Scale. Thus the hypothesis that creative people are able to generate
justifications for dishonesty quickly is only partially and weakly supported.
For this study, the two measures of creativity did not correlate with each other,
and this result may speak to the wide variety of ways that creativity can be measured (i.e.,
self-reported personality traits and self-reported creative productivity). A follow-up study
would be required to explain why one measure of creativity was correlated with number
of justifications generated while the other was not. One possibility may be that the
Creative Behavior Inventory measured reports of actual participant activities and
experience, and creating justifications was a creative performance task as well. Those
who scored high on the Creative Personality Scale simply viewed themselves as creative,
whereas those who scored high in the Creative Behavior Inventory had actually
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completed creative activities. However, previous research has found that global measures
of attitude do not accurately predict specific behaviors, with correlations rarely reaching
higher than .40 (Ajzen & Fishbein 1977; Kraus, 1995; McGuire, 1985; Wicker, 1969),
and so this connection may or may not explain the findings.
It is important to note that the Creative Behavior Inventory had an α coefficient of
.89 and produced a significant correlation with number of justifications, while the
Creative Personality Scale did not and only had an α coefficient of .63. The low
reliability of the Creative Personality Scale may be contributing to the non-significant
findings.
Hypothesis Two
In the first task, the total number of justifications produced was correlated with
the average perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior. It is this element that has been
implied previously (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but was not directly measured. While the
finding was significant, it is important to point out two ideas. First, the effect size was
small. Second, despite this effect, the average perceived acceptability of the behavior was
still between extremely unacceptable and unacceptable. Nevertheless, even small effects,
when aggregated over a lifetime can add up to large differences in life outcomes (Barrick
& Mount, 2005).
In the second task, the number of justifications provided was not significantly
correlated with the perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior. However, further
investigation found a non-linear relationship. Specifically, the number of “extremely
unacceptable responses” was lowered, and the number of “unacceptable” responses
increased when exposed to justifications. Overall, the behavior is still seen as less widely
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extremely unacceptable, but more broadly unacceptable. These findings may suggest that
the justifications provided opportunities for the participants to morally disengage from
what may otherwise be extremely harsh evaluations of the behavior (Bandura, 1991).
It is most likely that a person will view a dishonest behavior as extremely
unacceptable when no justifications have been evaluated and that exposure to at least
some justifications is associated with less intolerant evaluations. With two justifications,
participants were more likely to still perceive the behavior as unacceptable, just not
extremely unacceptable. Although exposure to at least some justifications appears to
lower the severity of participants’ judgments somewhat, there is no evidence that the
effect is cumulative, with additional justifications associated with less intolerance of
dishonest behavior.
The action of reading a person’s justifications may allow the participant to
consider the mind of and identify with the person acting dishonestly (Pizarro et al, 2006;
Young & Waytz, 2012), allowing them to identify with the person and their decision to
morally disengage (Bandura, 1991).
Hypothesis Three
This study was unable to find any significant connection between creativity and
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior whether the participants were presented
with justifications or asked to produce their own. Despite this, different indirect paths that
one could go from creativity to perceived acceptability of dishonesty were investigated.
In the first task, a significant path was found from the Creative Behavior Inventory to the
number of self-generated justifications, and then another significant path was found from
the number of self-generated justifications to perceived acceptability of dishonesty.
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However, the hypothesized indirect effect was not large enough to be statistically
significant.
Hypothesis Four
While a significant relationship was found between scores on the Creative
Behavior Inventory and the number of self-generated justifications, no other significant
relationships or moderating relationships were found. It is difficult to draw conclusions
on why this may be so without additional follow-up studies. Additionally, several
negative correlations were found between perceived acceptability of dishonesty and
measures of social desirability.
During the process of investigating the model, it was found that impression
management was associated with less tolerant evaluations of dishonest behavior, and as
previously reported in Hypothesis 2, exposure to at least some justifications was
associated with evaluating dishonest behavior less harshly.
Impression management was associated with less tolerant evaluations of dishonest
behavior. When impression management was low, there were more “unacceptable”
evaluations, than “extremely unacceptable” evaluations, but when Impression
Management was high, there were more “extremely unacceptable” evaluations than
“unacceptable” evaluations. When people are concerned with out they appear to others,
they are more likely to view dishonest behaviors extremely harshly. This coincides with
research that explains how one’s desire to be viewed as a moral person affect one’s
choices of behavior, as well as how one believes they will be viewed by others (Mead,
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). However, because these relationships
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were not of direct focus in the study and no moderating relationships were found, this
hypothesis as a whole is unsupported.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study had some limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the
participants were asked to produce justifications and perceived acceptability ratings on
the dishonest behaviors of others. In previous studies, the participants were put into
situations where they were dishonest for their own personal gain, rather than given the
opportunity to consider the dishonesty of another. Future studies should allow the
participants to personally gain from dishonesty while measuring number of justifications.
It is possible that since the participants were not asked to justify their own lies, they were
more likely to align their motivating emotions towards justifying a moral stance against
dishonesty, as seen in several studies (Haidt, 2001, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993), rather than
justifying the dishonesty. Perhaps it is not simply that creative people are more dishonest
in general, but that they are more dishonest when properly motivated to be so, and such
motivation may produce more robust findings. This leads to an additional research
question of “How does personal motivation affect one’s view of dishonesty?”
Additionally, three items from the Creative Personality Scale were unintentionally
omitted (clever, snobbish, and unconventional). The scale used in the current study was a
simple sum of the 27 remaining items (after reverse scoring the negatively keyed items).
In this study, the α coefficient for this scale was 0.63. Had the three omitted items been
included, the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula estimates that the reliability coefficient
might have been a little higher (α = .65), assuming that the omitted items were equally
good indicators as the 27 items that were included. Even at 0.65, this is only marginally
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acceptable. Achieving higher reliability with this measure may have resulted in a higher
correlation with the Creative Behavior Inventory, and the low reliability observed for this
measure may be contributing to the non-significant results. In a similar fashion, the low
reliability of the Self-Deception Scale of the BIDR observed in this sample may have
attenuated its predictive validity.
Third, a programming error resulted in the omission of the single-justification
condition in Task 2. The intended manipulation was 0, 1, 2, 4, and 8 justifications instead
of 0, 2, 4, and 8 justifications. Though regrettable, this error is unlikely to have altered
the results substantially. Even if there is something fundamentally different about the
experience of reading a single justification instead of multiple justifications, the original
hypothesis that exposure to multiple justifications has a cumulative effect on one’s
tolerance of dishonesty would not have been supported.
For this study, the majority of participants were between the ages of 18 and 20. At
this stage, many are only beginning to live independently, and their list of creative
achievements may include activities that their schools and/or families
required/encouraged. Additionally, their influences on self-view may still be heavily
reliant on their parents. Personality is impacted by a number of factors, including
environment (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2010). Some related research questions may be:


How do people of different age groups view dishonesty?



What role does creativity play in a person’s view of dishonesty over the lifespan?



Are children more likely to justify their dishonest behavior?



How does creativity manifest itself in middle aged versus young adults?
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Finally, in Task 1, the participants were asked to generate justifications for
dishonest behavior. Of the 925 responses, 205 of them were not justifications. This may
have been due to the style of administration. The participants completed the task on a
computer, with directions read aloud to them over the computer, and were asked to type
their responses. Perhaps if task one was given with a human reading the directions and
recording their responses, the directions could be further clarified, cutting down on the
number of non-justification responses.
Additionally, the existence of these non-justifications bring up additional
opportunities for study. Perhaps some of the participants were exhibiting moral
indignation at an authority asking them to justify dishonesty, leading to questions of
authority and morality as famously studied (Milgram, 1963). Some of the nonjustifications involved a participant essentially thinking out loud, and these responses
may inspire future studies into how personal narratives effect the way people view
themselves and their role as moral agents.
Overall, when it comes to creativity and honesty, the relationship appears to be
complicated. A person’s feelings and thoughts about right and wrong interact with each
other, and motivations seems to play an important role in how people view dishonesty.
This study found mixed results for whether creative people can produce more
justifications, and this may be due to what element of creativity is being measured,
motivation, or other factors. Justifications do seem related to perceived acceptability of
dishonesty, but again, this relationship is complicated, depending on who is lying, who is
producing justifications, and other possible factors. Finally, this study was unable to find
any significant connection between creativity and perceived acceptability of dishonest
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behavior, contrary to previous studies. In the end, what’s left are more questions than
answers, and rich possibilities for future investigations.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRES
Demographics Form

1. Age:
2. Gender:
3. Ethnicity:
4. Year in School:
5. College Major:
6. Approximate ISU GPA:
7. Sexual Orientation:
8. Mother’s Highest Educational Level:
9. Father’s Highest Educational Level:
10. Mother’s Approximate Income:
11. Father’s Approximate Income:
12. Creativity Personality Scale
Instructions: Read the following list of adjectives. Circle the ones that you think best
describe you.
1. affected
2. capable
3. cautious
4. commonplace
5. confident
6. conservative
7. conventional
8. dissatisfied
9. egotistical
10. honest
11. humorous
12. individualistic
13. informal
14. insightful
15. intelligent
16. interests narrow
17. interests wide
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18. inventive
19. mannerly
20. original
21. reflective
22. resourceful
23. self-confident
24. sexy
25. sincere
26. submissive
27. suspicious
Controlled Oral Word Association
Given one minute for each, write as many words as you can think of that begin with the
following
letters:
F, A, S
Categories:
Animals, names, furniture/fruit, clothing/sports
International Personality Item Pool
How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself?
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same
sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest
manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Indicate for each statement
whether it is Very Inaccurate, Moderately Inaccurate, Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate,
Moderately Accurate, or Very Accurate as a description of you.
1 -------------------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5
Very Inaccurate
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Neither

Am the life of the party.
Feel little concern for others.
Am always prepared.
Get stressed out easily.
Have a rich vocabulary.
Don’t talk a lot.
Am interested in people.
Leave my belongings around.
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Very Accurate

9. Am relaxed most of the time.
10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
11. Feel comfortable around people.
12. Insult people.
13. Pay attention to details.
14. Worry about things.
15. Have a vivid imagination.
16. Keep in the background.
17. Sympathize with others’ feelings.
18. Make a mess of things.
19. Seldom feel blue.
20. Am not interested in abstract ideas.
21. Start conversations
22. Am not interested in other people’s problems.
23. Get chores done right away.
24. Am easily disturbed.
25. Have excellent ideas.
26. Have little to say.
27. Have a soft heart.
28. Often forget to put things back in their proper place.
29. Get upset easily.
30. Do not have a good imagination
31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
32. Am not really interested in others.
33. Like order.
34. Change my mood a lot.
35. Am quick to understand things.
36. Don’t like to draw attention to myself.
37. Take time out for others.
38. Shirk my duties.
39. Have frequent mood swings.
40. Use difficult words.
41. Don’t mind being the center of attention.
42. Feel others’ emotions.
43. Follow a schedule.
44. Get irritated easily.
45. Spend time reflecting on things.
46. Am quiet around strangers.
47. Make people feel at ease.
48. Am exacting in my work.
49. Often feel blue.
50. Am full of ideas.
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
much you agree with it.

1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7
Not True

Somewhat True

Very True

1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me.
4. I have not always been honest with myself
5. I always know why I like things.
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
11. I never regret my decisions.
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough.
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
15. I am a completely rational person.
16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
17. I am very confident of my judgments.
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
22. I never cover up my mistakes.
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
24. I never swear.
25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30. I always declare everything at customs.
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32. I have never dropped litter on the street
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
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35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
36. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39. I have some pretty awful habits.
40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
Creative Behavior Inventory
Indicate if you have done each of the activities or accomplishments in your adolescent
and adult life never, once or twice, 3–5 times, or more than 5 times.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Received an award for acting
Worked as an editor for a school or university literary publication
Worked as an editor for a newspaper or similar organization
Constructed something that required scientific knowledge such as a radio,
telescope, scientific apparatus, etc. (excluding school or university course work)
5. Painted an original picture (excluding school or university course work)
6. Entered a speech contest
7. Designed and made your own greeting cards
8. Gave a recital
9. Presented an original mathematics paper to a professional or special interest group
10. Founded a literary magazine or similar publication
11. Made a craft out of metal (excluding school or university course work)
12. Made candles
13. Knitted or crocheted something (excluding school or university course work)
14. Put on a puppet show
15. Made your own holiday decorations
16. Built a hanging mobile (excluding school or university course work)
17. Received an award for performance in modern dance or ballet
18. Received an award for performance in popular dance
19. Had a mathematics paper published
20. Made a sculpture (excluding school or university course work)
21. Had original music published or publicly performed
22. Had a piece of literature (e.g., poem, short stories, etc.) published in a school or
university publication
23. Developed an experimental design (excluding school or university course work)
24. Wrote poems (excluding school or university course work)
25. Wrote a play (excluding school or university course work)
26. Entered a project or paper into a science contest
27. Received an award for an artistic accomplishment
28. Received an award for making a craft
29. Made a craft out of plastic, plexiglass, stained glass, or a similar material
(excluding school university course work)
30. Made cartoons
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31. Made a leather craft (excluding school or university course work)
32. Made a ceramic craft (excluding school or university course work)
33. Wrote music for one instrument (excluding school or university course work)
34. Wrote music for several instruments (excluding school or university course work)
35. Designed and made a piece of clothing (excluding school or university course
work)
36. Cooked an original dish
37. Prepared an original floral arrangement
38. Applied math in an original way to solve a practical problem (excluding school or
university course work)
39. Wrote an original computer program (excluding school or university course work)
40. Drew a picture for aesthetic reasons (excluding school or university course work)
41. Wrote the lyrics to a song (excluding school or university course work)
42. Choreographed a dance (excluding school or university course work)
43. Wrote a short story (excluding school or university course work)
44. Wrote something humorous such as jokes, limericks, satire, etc. (excluding school
or university course work)
45. Planned and presented an original speech (excluding school or university course
work)
46. Made jewelry (excluding school or university course work)
47. Cut a record
48. Put on a radio show
49. Had a piece of literature (e.g., poem, short story, etc.) published (not in a school
or university-related publication)
50. Took and developed your own photographs (not in a school or university-related
publication)
51. Performed a ballet or modern dance in a show or contest
52. Had art work or craft work publically exhibited
53. Won an award for musical accomplishments
54. Wrote clever or humorous letters
55. Designed a game
56. Directed or organized a political group
57. Won an award for a scientific project or paper
58. Performed on television
59. Assisted in the design of a set for a musical or dramatic production (excluding
school or university work)
60. Had art work published in a school or university publication
61. Had a role in a dramatic production (excluding school or university work)
62. Had art work published (excluding school or university work)
63. Started but did not finish a novel (excluding school or university work)
64. Wrote and completed a novel (excluding school or university work)
65. Made or helped make a film or video tape (excluding school or university work)
66. Made a musical instrument
67. Helped design a float
68. Won an award for some achievement in literature
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69. Entered a mathematical paper or project into a contest
70. Had a scientific paper published
71. Planned and kept a garden
72. Kept a sketchbook (excluding school or university work)
73. Was a participating member of a symphony orchestra
74. Entered a contest as a singer
75. Entered a contest as a musician
76. Designed and constructed a craft out of wood (excluding school or university
work)
77. Planned and directed a school or community event
78. Won an award for speech and debate
79. Wrote a play which was given in a public performance
80. Directed or managed a dramatic production
81. Designed and made a costume
82. Made up magic tricks
83. Played an instrument (percussion, including piano) with a reasonable degree of
proficiency
84. Played an instrument (string) with a reasonable degree of proficiency
85. Played an instrument (brass) with a reasonable degree of proficiency
86. Played an instrument (wind) with a reasonable degree of proficiency
87. Participated in a drama workshop
88. Participated in a craft workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding school
or university work)
89. Participated in a writers’ workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding
school or university work)
90. Participated in a dance workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding school
or university work)
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APPENDIX B
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

Illinois State University

Department of Psychology

Informed Consent
Principal Investigators:

Dr. Joel Schneider

PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY. SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW ONLY IF
YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE AND YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR RIGHTS. YOUR
SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH. YOU MUST BE 18
YEARS OF AGE TO PARTICIPATE. IF YOU DESIRE A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM, YOU
MAY REQUEST ONE AND WE WILL PROVIDE IT.
Description of the Study: This study will ask you to complete several surveys regarding your
personality, how you would describe yourself, your life achievements, opinions on several topics, word
associations, and general information about yourself. You will also be asked to evaluate situations where
someone behaved dishonestly by creating possible explanations for the behavior. We are also interested in
your opinion of how acceptable it would be to act dishonestly in those situations.
Nature of Participation:
surveys and the activities.

You will spend approximately 45 minutes to an hour completing the

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study is to better understand between opinions about
dishonest behaviors, justifications for those behaviors, and an individual’s characteristics.
Possible Risks: Overall, we do not expect any large risks based on the contents of the
surveys. There may be a slight risk of negative emotions when asked think about dishonest behaviors. This
risk is not more than what you would likely encounter in your day to day life.
Possible Benefits: As a possible benefit to this study, you may find the experience interesting or
may inadvertently gain valuable self-knowledge.
Compensation for your time: You will receive extra credit in a psychology course. You will
receive extra credit simply by virtue of coming to your appointment; you are free to withdraw your
participation at any time without penalty.
Confidentiality: Your questionnaire packet has been assigned a code number that will protect
your identity. All data will be kept in secured files, in accord with the standards of the University, Federal
regulations, and the American Psychological Association. Finally, it is no individual person’s responses
that interest us; we are studying people in general.
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Opportunities to Question: Any technical questions about this research may be directed to Dr.
William Joel Schneider at 438-8410. Any questions regarding your rights as a research participant or
research-related injuries may be directed to ISU’s Office of Research Ethics and Compliance (309) 4382520.
Opportunities to Withdraw at Will: If you decide now or at any point to withdraw this consent
or stop participation, you are free to do so at no penalty to yourself. You are free to skip specific questions
and continue participating at no penalty.
Opportunities to be Informed of Results: In all likelihood, the results will be fully available
around the May 2015. If you wish to be told the results of this research, please contact Dr. Joel Schneider
309- 438-8410. He will either meet with you to discuss the results or direct you to a copy of the results. In
addition, there is a chance that the results from this study will be published in a scientific psychology
journal, which would be available in many libraries. In such an article, participants would be identified in
general terms such as "college students.”
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I consent to participate in this study. I further acknowledge that I have received an offer to obtain
a copy of this consent form.

Signature

Date
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APPENDIX C
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

Psychological researchers have found that people who report being more creative
also tend to engage in higher levels of dishonest behavior. It is not yet known why this
finding occurs. We are investigating the question as to whether creative people can
fluently think of more reasons to be dishonest.
If you would like to know the results of this study, you may contact the principal
investigator, Joel Schneider at (309) 438-8410, or wjschne@ilstu.edu.
If participating in this study has caused you discomfort, please be aware that you
can contact the principal investigator, Joel Schneider at (309) 438-8410, or
wjschne@ilstu.edu. You may also contact the ISU Student Counseling Services (4383655, in the Student Services Building) for free counseling and consultation.
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